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Popular Sovereignty and Legality

Christopher J. Peters

Abstract: This talk, prepared for delivery at the 2008 Wayne State University
Humanities Center Faculty Fellows Conference, explores the relationship between
popular sovereignty and legality. Legality – in particular, legal rights entrenched in a
constitution – often is thought to conflict with popular sovereignty in a way that mirrors
the supposed tension between individual autonomy and legal authority. Both perceived
conflicts, however, rest in part upon the problematic idea that the law knows better than
legal subjects what to do in particular cases. In fact, legal authority is best justified as a
means of resolving disputes about what to do in particular cases. A dispute-resolution
account of law shifts the focus away from the supposed conflict between law on the one
hand and individual autonomy or popular sovereignty on the other, and toward the
function of law as a means of settling conflict about, among other things, what autonomy
and popular sovereignty entail. In particular, the dispute-resolution account suggests that
judicially enforced constitutional rights might serve as a relatively neutral means of
settling disagreements about the relationship between political majorities and political
minorities.
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POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND LEGALITY*
C.J. Peters†
I.
Is the idea of popular sovereignty somehow inconsistent with the idea of legality? You
wouldn’t think so from American political rhetoric, in which “democracy” and “the rule of law”
typically are packaged together and labeled for export to less fortunate parts of the globe.1 And
yet it seems that, when push comes to shove, either popular sovereignty or legality must give
way to the other.
Imagine that the large majority of the people of a democratic nation, in the wake of a
devastating terrorist attack, decides it is wise to imprison suspected terrorists indefinitely and
without judicial process. But suppose the nation has a written constitution whose norms purport
to be immune from change through ordinary democratic politics; and suppose one or more of
those constitutional norms purport to prohibit the action the people now want to take. Why
should the people risk further catastrophe by obeying what now seem to be unwise constitutional
provisions? Of course, the people could amend their constitution according to the procedures
required by the constitution itself, but why should the people be put to this trouble in order to do
*
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University Humanities Center’s Faculty Fellows Conference on the topic “Sovereignty, Justice and the Law Across
Disciplines,” held on April 11, 2008. The ideas expressed here form part of an ongoing book-length project in
which I present a dispute-resolution model of law and democracy. Please do not cite or quote this text without the
author’s express permission.
†
Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. For their helpful comments, I thank the
participants in a faculty workshop at the Law School, and especially Derek Bambauer, Tony Dillof, and Paul
Dubinsky. Thanks also to Bob Sedler for organizing the workshop and to Walter Edwards and the WSU Humanities
Center for sponsoring the Conference and providing financial support.
1
President George W. Bush, for example, frequently cited “the rule of law” as one of the values that would
accompany the global spread of “democracy.” See, e.g., George W. Bush, Remarks to the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 6, 2003) (“Recent surveys in Arab nations reveal broad support for political
pluralism, the rule of law, and free speech. These are the stirrings of Middle Eastern democracy ….”); George W.
Bush, Speech at Brasilia, Brazil (Nov. 6, 2005) (“Each democracy has its own character and culture that reflects its
unique traditions and history. Yet all free and successful countries share some common characteristics: freedom to
worship, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, economic liberty, equal justice under the rule of law, equal
citizenship for all – and the limitation of state power through checks and balances.”) (emphases added).
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what they now think is right? Amending a constitution requires considerable time and resources,
both of which might more usefully be devoted elsewhere during a crisis. And it might seem
foolish to rewrite the constitution in order to deal with what appears to be a momentary
emergency that is likely to pass in relatively short order.
If we believe the nation’s constitution poses at least some normative obstacle to the
people’s doing what they now think is wise, then we have recognized a tension between popular
sovereignty, at least in its purest form, and legality or “the rule of law,” at least in its
constitutional form. This tension seems analogous to the supposed conflict between individual
moral autonomy and legal authority. According to the anarchist philosopher Robert Paul Wolff,
moral autonomy requires each individual to take an action only if she herself believes it is
appropriate on its merits.2 On this view, legal authority is inconsistent with autonomy because it
purports to require a person to act, not because she herself thinks that action is appropriate, but
because someone else – the wielder of legal authority – thinks so.
Suppose, for example, that a motorcyclist carefully considers all the pros and cons of
wearing a helmet and decides it is best not to wear one. If the law tells her she must wear a
helmet, the law seems to be trumping her own normative judgment and thus denying her ability
to act autonomously. The relationship of the law to the individual’s autonomy looks like a
microcosmic version of the relationship between constitutional law and popular sovereignty. In
either context, the law claims to override the best judgment of its subject (individual person or
collective “people”) about how to act.
Of course, it seems true that both individuals and peoples must accept obedience to “law”
of some form in order to function as individuals or peoples. The Kantian understanding of
autonomy involves not complete freedom from constraint, but the ability to bind oneself to
2

See ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970).
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norms that are the product of one’s own will;3 and indeed the literal translation of the Greek
word “autonomy” is “self-law-giving.” Some degree of self-law-giving seems necessary for any
person to live her life as she wishes – to be free from harmful impulsive or compulsive
behaviors, for instance, and to make and follow through on plans.
It likewise seems impossible for a democratic people to exist and operate as a people
without following some laws it has established for itself. At the very least, a people will have to
establish basic ground rules for defining who they are – who belongs to “the people” and who
does not – and for determining by what means and in what forms they can be said to act
collectively. They will, that is, have to constitute themselves and their institutions and processes
of government; they will need “constitutional” law in the core sense of that concept. So, for
example, in the United States Constitution “We the People of the United States” purport both to
bind and, in a sense, to establish themselves; to determine their identity by prohibiting the use of
certain criteria (such as race and gender) to deny citizenship; to prescribe institutions and
procedures for making, enforcing, and interpreting their laws; and so forth. Without some
foundational legal norms like these, a people would be not a collectivity but simply a collection
of individuals, and popular sovereignty (or indeed sovereignty of any kind) would be impossible.
But to recognize the need for some amount of self-law-giving, as an individual or as a
people, is not to acknowledge the legitimacy of laws imposed by some external force. In the
constitutional context, we might be able to imagine that “the people” that constituted itself and
its institutions however long ago is one and the same “people” that is defined, enabled, and
constrained by that constitutional act today. Indeed we may have to indulge this conceptual
stretch in order to make the ideas of a “people” and of popular sovereignty coherent. This
conception of constitutional law as merely, and necessarily, constitutive of self-government
3

See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 98-99 (H.J. Paton ed., 1964).
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seems inapt, however, when constitutional norms leave the realm of the merely institutional or
procedural and enter the realm of the substantive – when a constitutional provision purports, not
to enable popular self-governance, but to limit what the self-governing people is entitled to do.
Such constraints appear less like the people’s self-made plans and more like an external force
substituting its judgment for the people’s own.
This kind of constraint seems to be the chief function of many or most of those legal
norms we classify as “constitutional rights.” Consider the Fifth Amendment’s requirements of
grand-jury indictment and due process of law, or the Sixth Amendment’s guarantees of the
assistance of counsel and a speedy and public trial by jury. None of these rights comfortably can
be understood as constituting Americans as a people or as providing the necessary institutional
and procedural framework for our exercise of popular sovereignty. Each of them, rather,
purports to limit our ability to exercise our sovereignty by, for example, detaining suspected
terrorists indefinitely without charge when we think that is the right thing to do. Constitutional
rights seem irreconcilably to conflict with popular sovereignty, and thus they beg for some
justification.
II.
I want to suggest here that each of these perceived tensions – between autonomy and
legal authority generally, and between popular sovereignty and constitutional rights in particular
– is infected by an inadequate account of the authority of law.
Consider two different ways of justifying the authority of the law. One of them goes
back at least to Plato and counts among its adherents Aristotle, Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and
most contemporary legal positivists, including Joseph Raz, who is its most influential current
proponent. I’ll refer to this justification as the epistemic-guidance account of legal authority.

4
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According to the epistemic-guidance account, law derives its legitimate authority from its
capacity to identify the best course of action in most cases, a capacity that exceeds that of the
person (or the people, collectively) that is subject to the law.4 On this account, the motorcyclist
should obey the helmet law, despite her disagreement with it, because the law is more likely than
the motorcyclist herself to know whether wearing a helmet is the right thing to do. On this
account, too, the American people should obey the commands of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, despite disagreeing with their requirements for treating suspected terrorists,
because the Constitution is more likely than the people themselves to know whether indictment,
trial by jury, access to counsel, and due process of law are the right things to do in those
circumstances.
If the epistemic-guidance account is correct, then there really is a conflict between
individual moral autonomy and legal authority, and between popular sovereignty and
constitutional rights: In each context, the external judgment embodied in the law trumps the
judgment of the legal subject (the individual person or the collective people), and the legal
subject is no longer fully self-governing.
But there is good reason to question the epistemic-guidance account.5 It is, first of all,
quite implausible to think that the law’s capacity to identify the right course of action is superior
to the legal subject’s in every case. As Aristotle observed, general laws often – one might say
invariably – apply suboptimally in some particular cases covered by them.6 For Aristotle, this
was a function of that fact that a lawmaker could not foresee every circumstance in which its
4

For Raz’s version of this account, which he calls the “service” conception, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM 23-105 (1986).
5
For a sophisticated critique of the epistemic-guidance account along these lines, see Scott J. Shapiro,
Authority, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 382 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002). Shapiro refers to what I call the epistemic-guidance account as the “mediation model,” because
it holds that law mediates between legal subjects and the reasons applicable to their actions.
6
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, ch. 10, at 1020 (W.D. Ross trans., Richard McKeon ed.
1941).
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general law would apply. (The eighteenth-century Framers of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,
for instance, hardly could have anticipated international terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction.) But it seems likely that even with respect to many cases the lawmaker can
anticipate, its judgment about what to do in those cases will be less reliable than the on-the-spot
judgment of the legal subject actually faced with them. Why should we think a state legislature
is a better judge than the individual motorcyclist about whether, as to her, the costs of going
helmetless outweigh the benefits? Why should we imagine that the balance between individual
liberty and national security struck by eighteenth-century Framers is somehow better than the
balance we could strike for ourselves today?
Of course, the likelihood that the legal subject will be a better judge of what to do than
the law in some cases isn’t necessarily fatal to the epistemic-guidance account; it still might be
the case that the law is the best judge more often than not. But the law’s generally superior
epistemic capacity does not provide a reason to obey the law in one of those exceptional cases
where the premise does not hold; and the problem is that any given case might be one of those
exceptional cases. Indeed, the best evidence we are likely to have regarding whether the case we
find ourselves in is such a case is the existence, and strength, of our own disagreement with what
the law is telling us to do. If the motorcyclist strongly believes the mandatory-helmet law is
wrong as applied to her, this belief is powerful evidence that the law does not know better than
she does in that case – and thus that the law’s purported authority over her in that case is
illegitimate. If the American people strongly believe that indefinite detention of suspected
terrorists is the right thing to do, that belief itself is an argument that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments have no authority over us on that question.

6
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The trouble with the epistemic-guidance account, then, is that the claim it makes for the

legitimacy of legal authority is weakest when the need for legal authority is strongest – namely in
those cases where legal subjects vigorously disagree with the substance of the law’s commands.
There is, however, an alternative account of legal authority that can avoid this difficulty, an
account I will call the dispute-resolution model.
The pedigree of the dispute-resolution model, while not as long as that of the epistemicguidance account, still reaches back pretty far, through Kant and Locke to probably its first great
champion, Thomas Hobbes. On the dispute-resolution account, law draws its authority not from
its supposedly superior capacity to determine the right course of action in particular cases, but
rather from its capacity to resolve disputes among legal subjects about what is the right course of
action in particular cases. A person should obey a disagreeable law, not because the law is more
likely to be correct than she is in that particular case, but because the costs of obedience are less
than the dispute-related costs that would exist absent the law. So our motorcyclist has reason to
obey the helmet law despite her strong disagreement with it, namely that the law represents a
reasonable resolution of social disagreement about the wearing of motorcycle helmets, and that
the costs of continuing that disagreement without resolution ultimately are greater than the costs
of accepting a resolution she finds distasteful. Likewise, the American people have reason to
honor the limitations imposed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments – not because those
Amendments necessarily “get it right” on the subject of detaining suspected terrorists, but
because they represent a reasonable settlement of social disagreement regarding what it means to
“get it right” on that issue.
Note that the dispute-resolution account can avoid the self-erosion problem that plagues
its rival. The dispute-resolution account makes no claim that law generates “correct” answers in

7
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all, most, or even many cases, and so it is not embarrassed by the existence of cases in which the
law seems to be wrong. More to the point, a legal subject’s disagreement with the law’s
command in a given case does not constitute evidence against the law’s legitimate authority over
her in that case. The motorcyclist can’t deny the law’s authority on the ground that she disagrees
with what the law is telling her to do; the existence of disagreement about what to do is precisely
the point of having authoritative law.
Note also – and here we get to the heart of the matter – that the dispute-resolution
account takes the sting out of the supposed conflict between legal authority and individual moral
autonomy. A small part of the point here is the fact that threats to individual autonomy can come
from other individuals, and that law (and the means to enforce it) can reduce these threats.
Hence the bare Hobbesian justification of law, as a way to coerce self-interested bad actors into
refraining from themselves coercing others.7 But the simple Hobbesian story is only a small part
of the point, because by itself it won’t satisfy Wolff and other defenders of autonomy. Wolff
resents, not law’s coercion of those who act in bad faith to impair others’ autonomy, but law’s
substitution of its commands for the good-faith judgments of individuals. He objects, not to laws
against stealing other people’s motorcycles, but to laws requiring helmet use by motorcyclists
whose best judgment does not require it.
As envisioned by Wolff, then, the law-autonomy conflict embodies a stark choice
between the individual’s and the law’s moral judgments. The dispute-resolution account
challenges this vision by recognizing that a more fundamental choice needs to be made: a choice
among the conflicting moral judgments of different individuals. The fact is that people often
disagree about the boundaries between one person’s autonomy and another’s, or about what
constitutes “autonomy” in the first place and whether it is worth protecting, or about countless
7

See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (1651).
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other questions of morality and policy. People disagree, for instance, about whether helmet use
is a matter for the individual motorcyclist to decide, or instead is something that the public – in
the interests of family members, employers, other motorists, those who pay insurance premiums,
and so forth – ought to be in the business of regulating. These sorts of disagreements might be
motivated primarily by conflicting self-interests, as Hobbes emphasized, but they need not be.
As Jeremy Waldron explains in his excellent book Law and Disagreement, many disagreements
will be the product of good-faith, reasonable views that, thanks to something akin to what John
Rawls called “the burdens of judgment,” happen to conflict with each other.8 Perhaps most
disagreements will derive from some inextricable combination of self-interest and reasonable,
good-faith views.
What the dispute-resolution account allows us to see is that the ubiquitous fact of
disagreement, whatever its source, renders inadequate a simplistic dichotomy between legal
commands and individual moral judgment. Individuals’ moral judgments often conflict, and
when they do someone’s judgment necessarily must be compromised or overridden. Proponents
and opponents of mandatory-motorcycle-helmet laws can’t both have their way. Nor can they
dispute the issue indefinitely, with all the direct and opportunity costs, and the ongoing
uncertainty, that would entail. The issue must be settled somehow; and it might be that the law,
if it is generated and enforced in the proper way, is capable of reaching a settlement that
everyone (even the losers) should accept. If so, then it is not open for one of those losers to
object that the law impairs her autonomy by overriding her own moral judgment. Overriding the
judgments of some in order to resolve conflicts among competing judgments is the reason for
having law.

8

See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 111-13, 151-53 (1999) (citing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM 54-58 (1993)).
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We might extend this insight to the case of popular sovereignty. The tendency of many

writers on the relationship between popular sovereignty (or democracy) and constitutional rights
– superficially a rhetorical tendency but often, I think, one that reflects more substantively
engrained ways of thinking – is to refer to “the people” as a monolithic entity that stands in a
dialectic relationship to some external, nonpopulist force, such as the constitutional Framers or
the Supreme Court.9 This tendency, not coincidentally, runs backward to the Framers
themselves; Hamilton famously defended judicial review in the 78th Federalist as a means of
ensuring that “the power of the people is superior to both” the judicial and the legislative
power.10 But of course “the people” of the United States in 2008 never agree among themselves
on anything, any more than they did in 1787 (and probably, in fact, somewhat less). The crucial
question of modern democratic theory is not whether the will or judgment of “the people” may or
should be constrained by some external norms like constitutional rights, but rather how to
adjudicate inevitable disagreements among the people about, among other things, whether
“rights” should be recognized and, if so, which ones and to what extent.
It may be that constitutional law is, or can be, a reasonable response to this problem of
disagreement among the people about issues of rights, in the same way that law more generally
can be a reasonable response to disagreement among individuals about their own respective

9

Here are just a couple of prominent examples: ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (2d ed. 1986) (1962) (“[W]hen the Supreme Court
declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action of an elected representative, it thwarts the will of the
representatives of the people of the here and now ….”); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (“We in the twenty-first century tend to divide the world into two
distinct domains: a domain of politics and a domain of law. In politics, the people rule. But not in law. Law is set
aside for a trained elite of judges and lawyers whose professional task is to implement the formal decisions produced
in and by politics.”). Defenders of judicially enforced constitutional rights often fall into this rhetorical pattern
themselves (with Alexander Hamilton as an historical role model; see note 10 and accompanying text); e.g.,
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 3 (“ … I maintain that the Supreme Court
should be understood as a kind of representative institution well-shaped to speak on behalf of the people about
questions of moral and political principle.”).
10
Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 436, 439 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(1788).
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rights and duties. But there is a powerful objection to such a conclusion, posed most articulately
in some of Professor Waldron’s recent work.
III.
If I read him right, Professor Waldron agrees with the basic Hobbesian insight that law is
primarily a product, not of some urge to tell people how to act, but of the imperative to resolve
disputes among people about how to act. But Professor Waldron notes that law can serve that
function only to the extent it provides a reason for the “losers” of disputes nonetheless to accept
the results that law prescribes. The crucial question for Professor Waldron then becomes: What
kind or kinds of reasons for acceptance can law offer to the losers of disputes?11
Professor Waldron suggests that the reasons for acceptance must be noninstrumental
ones; they must derive from some intrinsic aspects of the procedure employed to resolve
disputes, such as its fairness or its participatory nature.12 He points out that the rightness or
goodness of a particular result generated by a procedure cannot serve as a reason for the loser to
accept that result, because of course the loser will not agree that the result is right or good; that’s
why the procedure is needed in the first place.13 We can’t tell the motorcyclist to obey the
helmet law because wearing a helmet is the right thing to do, which is precisely the assertion she
disagrees with. And if the substantive quality of the result won’t satisfy the loser, the only thing
left seems to be something inherent in the procedure itself: perhaps the fact that the loser has had
the opportunity to participate in that procedure on equal terms with the winner.

11

See WALDRON, supra note 8, at 243-49; Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review,
113 YALE L.J. 1346, 1369-72 (2006).
12
To be precise, Waldron argues that what he sees as the core procedural value – the right of participation –
is best understood as noninstrumental. See WALDRON, supra note 8, at 239-54. Elsewhere, Waldron acknowledges
the possibility of a certain kind of instrumentalist or “outcome-based” justification of procedure, namely one that
turns on that procedure’s capacity to produce accurate results on a systemic level. See Waldron, supra note 11, at
1373-74.
13
See Waldron, supra note 11, at 1373.
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From this premise – that the law must provide noninstrumental procedural reasons to

accept its commands – Professor Waldron builds a case against judicially enforced constitutional
rights.14 He notes that majoritarian democracy is about as fair and evenhandedly participatory a
procedure as one could devise for the resolution of disputes: Each affected party gets a single
vote and thus an equal say in the outcome. In contrast, judicial enforcement of constitutional
rights gives vastly disproportionate decisionmaking power to a small elite: unelected judges, and
of course the constitutional Framers, who can’t even be counted among the affected parties,
having been dead for one or two centuries. Majoritarian democracy thus offers to the losers a
strong reason for acceptance – their fair participation in the process – that constitutional
adjudication utterly lacks.
We should take note, however – and with all due respect to Professor Waldron – that the
procedural feature of fair participation he identifies with majoritarian democracy is not
necessarily the only process-based reason one might have for accepting an otherwise
disagreeable result. Consider a feature we typically identify not with popular sovereignty but
with legality: the presence of a neutral third party to arbitrate a dispute. To be sure, fair
participation is important in legal proceedings as well, as the Supreme Court has recognized by
interpreting due process to require notice and an opportunity to be heard.15 But notice and an
opportunity to be heard in court become meaningless if the presiding judge is biased against one
of the parties or strongly predisposed against one of their legal positions. In adjudication, the
reasonable neutrality of the decisionmaker is a process-based reason to accept the decision; the
absence of that neutrality is a process-based reason to reject it.

14

See WALDRON, supra note 8, at 211-312; Waldron, supra note 11, at 1386-95.
See, e.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972).
15
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Could it be that the concept of judicial neutrality has an analogue in the idea of judicially

enforceable constitutional rights? Consider two salient features of those rights that distinguish
them from the results of majoritarian democracy.16 First, constitutional rights are determined,
not by argument from first principles of morality or about political costs and benefits, but
through the interpretation of textual provisions ratified by the supermajoritarian act of a previous
generation. In deciding whether indefinite detention of suspected terrorists violates the Fifth
Amendment, the question is not whether that detention is morally right or wrong or good or bad
policy; the question is whether it accords with whatever the Amendment means by “due process
of law.”
Second, the primary task of interpreting the Constitution is assigned to lawyers – experts
in the interpretation of normative texts – who operate at a considerable remove from the
everyday pressures of partisan politics. The meaning of “due process of law” as it applies to the
detention of suspected terrorists will be spelled out, not by moral philosophers or welfare
economists or bureaucrats, and certainly not by public-opinion pollsters, but by judges who are
neither appointed nor subject to removal by popular election.
If constitutional adjudication were designed to serve the same function as majoritarian
democracy, these procedural properties of interpretation and political insulation would seem
entirely mysterious. But they begin to make some sense if we understand constitutional law as a
response to disputes about majoritarian democracy. In the American system, adjudication of
constitutional rights decides two kinds of questions: those involving claims that certain activities
or interests (such as self-expression, religious belief and practice, sexual and reproductive
choice, and racial equality) are immune from calculations of majority interest or preference; and

16

To their disadvantage, Professor Waldron believes. See WALDRON, supra note 8, at 220, 289-92;
Waldron, supra note 11, at 1376-86.
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those involving the basic terms of membership and fair participation in the political community.
These questions tend to be perennially and deeply divisive. And the political losers on these
issues – those who claim some immunity from the results of majoritarian politics or an unfair
denial of full participation in those politics – tend, by the very nature of the issues, to distrust
majoritarian politics as a way of resolving them.
Constitutional adjudication offers some degree of distance from the politics whose results
or structure are being challenged. When a court assesses the constitutionality of a statute, it
doesn’t simply choose sides between the current political majority and the current political
minority, as majoritarian politics does virtually by definition. Instead, it tries to resolve the
majority-minority dispute by drawing to some meaningful extent on the supermajoritarian
judgments made by previous generations at pivotal moments in the nation’s history; this is the
value of the otherwise mysterious interpretive focus of constitutional law. The very “otherness”
of the Framers who drafted and ratified the Constitution is what gives their commands some
claim to neutrality with respect to our current disputes. And the relative political insulation of
the judges who must interpret their commands reinforces that claim to neutrality. Thus the
message a court tries to send to the losers of constitutional disputes is not “you have been
outvoted” or even “you are wrong” – messages implicit in the results of majoritarian politics –
but rather “your position on this issue does not accord with our best understanding of what the
Constitution – the law – requires.” It is a version of the same message that judges, at least good
ones, always try send to losing litigants in any kind of case.
Of course there are many qualifications and complexities here. For one thing, the views
of the Framers about particular contemporary issues almost never are identifiable and often do
not exist at all, despite what some originalists would have us think. This puts much or most of

14
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the task of judgment squarely in the hands of contemporary judges, who rarely if ever are
“neutral” in the sense of lacking even an ideological stake in the controversy being decided.
(Not to pick on Justice Scalia, but anyone who thinks he is morally “neutral” on, say, questions
of religious freedom or remedies for racial inequality has not been paying attention.)
But the practical question we have to ask – the only question we can ask, I think – is
whether a system of constitutional adjudication, taken as a whole, can offer enough detachment
from majoritarian politics to be acceptable as a way of resolving, if only provisionally (always
only provisionally), those controversies about majority-minority relations that are too persistent
and deep-seated to be trusted, by the minority, to majoritarian politics alone. The answer will
not invariably be “yes”; but I think it has been “yes” most of the time in the American system.
Usually – and admittedly with important lapses, as in Dred Scott, Lochner v. New York, Bush v.
Gore, arguably Roe v. Wade – the constitutional basis of the Supreme Court’s decisions has been
persuasive enough that the Court has avoided accusations, at least from the mainstream, of
simply taking sides.
And of course constitutional neutrality or the appearance of it, especially when it
obviously is so severely compromised in practice, might sometimes have to yield to that other
procedural value that Professor Waldron rightly identifies as important, the value of fair
participation. But we should notice in this regard that American constitutional adjudication
actually strikes something of a balance between the two values. Its interpretive focus, the
relative political insularity of its judges, and the longevity of a typical Justice’s tenure on the
Court keep it from shifting with every momentary change in the political winds. At the same
time, the political inputs into constitutional adjudication are many and diverse. Individual
Justices may remain on the Court for long periods of time, but the Court’s overall membership in
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fact changes quite frequently; and when it does, the appointments process is intensely political.
Judges, moreover, are not magically immune from the social, cultural, and political trends that
move the society to which they belong. And the adjudicative process itself is, at the
constitutional level, broadly and actively participatory; the Supreme Court rarely decides a
constitutional question without hearing from well-financed litigants and amici curiae on all
sides. The result is that constitutional jurisprudence, assessed over the medium- to long term,
rarely strays too far from the election returns.
If this is right, then in a sense popular sovereignty – not as a mythical unanimous will of
“the people,” but as a basic premise that all contentious issues must eventually be settled
democratically – ultimately trumps legality after all; even in a constitutional democracy, the
people ultimately make the law that binds them. The principle of legality simply reminds us that
democracy is characterized by disagreement, and it suggests that democratic procedures by
themselves will not always be capable of resolving those disagreements in a way the losing
minority can accept.
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